• • understand different models of oligopoly coordination and give an account of, why they arrive at different predictions,
• • understand how horizontal mergers may be modelled and how the effect of a merger depends on fundamentals,
• • understand how different vertical restraints complement or supplement each other in solving vertical coordination problems or how and when they may lead to foreclosure
• • understand the literature on network effects and two-sided markets and solve models that involve such competitive forces
• • master the basic techniques of structural empirical studies of industries with market power and of innovation and markets structure, and exemplify how the techniques may be used

The purpose of this course is to progress on some topics from the undergraduate teaching of Microeconomics and /or Industrial Organization (e.g. oligopoly coordination or vertical restraints) and to cover some additional topics (for example the economics of networks and two-sided markets, mergers, as well as R&D and innovation). The course will also cover the new empirical industrial economics that analyses real market behaviour on the basis of rigid IO theory. It is assumed that students are familiar with Intermediate Microeconomics.

Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz (2010), Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press and a collection of articles.